NATO Is Now the Military Branch of the World Economic Forum
By Robin Monotti | Dr Mike Yeadon | Cory Mornings
This explains the UN planes landing in Ottawa with the German speaking military who rebranded themselves as “police”.
This was most likely part of the playbook: provoke riots then call a State of Emergency send foreign NATO troops disguised as Police who have no empathy with the local civilians.
This also explains why the attacks on the eastern Ukrainian breakaway republics is just another front in the same war waged by the World Economic Forum and its military branch NATO.
This also explains why no political leader in any NATO country has condemned the outrageous violence and use of LRADs and electro-magnetic radiation weapons deployed on peaceful protesters in Ottawa or Canberra.
Who Are Partners Of Nato?
As part of NATO’s global partnership, Afghanistan, Australia, Colombia, Iraq, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, and Pakistan are some of its allies.
Which Countries Of East Europe Joined “The Partnership For Peace Pfp Plan”?
As a result, 14 nations of the PfP have joined NATO (in particular Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia).
NATO WARS ARE NOW WAGED ONTO THE PEOPLE OF NATO COUNTRIES & BEYOND ON BEHALF OF THE TECHNO-PHARMACEUTICAL OLIGARCHY.
“The future of NATO”
Session at the World Economic Forum with participation of NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
Julie Bishop [Former Foreign Minister of Australia, Moderator]: Good morning and thank you for joining us at this live-streamed event. We have a very distinguished panel to discuss the future of NATO.
I’m Julie Bishop, the former Foreign Minister of Australia from 2013-18. During that time, Australia became an enhanced partner of NATO. I’m currently the Chancellor of Australian National University.
The discussion is going to be lively, it’s going to be topical, please feel free to Tweet, Insta, Facebook, #wef20, #Davos, # – whatever you like. And the focus today, of course, is on NATO in its 70th year. 70 years on, how has it performed? And given the external threats, the internal pressures, how will it endure? The Treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4th April 1949 by twelve founding states and it committed to resolving international disputes peacefully amongst the Allies. It clearly states that an attack on one member is considered an attack against them all. Of course, the credibility of any treaty rests on the perceived commitment of its members to its enforcement and it’s been a fair assumption that any adversary would face an overwhelming response to any military attack on a NATO member. But that commitment’s been called into question in recent times, in fact, by some of the most senior NATO members themselves. So we’ll try to cover as much as we can. If there’s an opportunity for questions from the floor, I’ll certainly try to take it.
Now, our distinguished panel, first we have President Andrzej Duda of Poland; has been President since 2015. Of course, Poland has been a NATO member since 1997. Then we have Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who’s been Secretary General of NATO since 2014 and, of course, is a former Prime Minister of Norway. Then we have Minister Vincenzo Amendola, recently appointed the Minister for European Affairs of Italy and of course, Italy, a Mediterranean country, some distance from the Atlantic, but nevertheless has been a member of NATO since its inception. And then my dear friend, Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey since 2014, Mevlüt? Yeah. And of course, Turkey became a member of NATO in 1952.
So to kick things off, I will ask, perhaps, the Secretary General to give us a short overview of where NATO stands today, where you see the challenges and how it will endure. And then I’ll ask President Duda to reflect from Poland’s perspective, before coming to some of the specific criticisms that I’ll put to both Mevlüt and Vincenzo.
Jens Stoltenberg [NATO Secretary General]: Well, in short, NATO is the most successful alliance in history and we are the most successful alliance in history for one reason: and that’s because we have been able to bring North America and Europe together after two devastating world wars. So we came together and decided this must never happen again. And then, for more than 70 years, NATO has been keen in providing peace, preserving peace and making sure that no NATO Ally has suffered a military armed attack.
So that is actually a great success story, just to preserve peace, especially in Europe, where, kind of, war was the kind of norm. We have an unprecedented period of peace in the continent, where war was a kind of normal thing for centuries. Then, so I . . . it’s a great success story, but success in the past is not a guarantee for success in the future. And I read newspapers and I watch TV, so I’m aware that there are people questioning the strength of NATO. And we see questions being asked, both in Europe and in North America. And of course, there are differences between NATO Allies. We see serious differences on serious issues, such as trade, climate change, the Iran nuclear deal and many other issues. And that’s a challenge for the transatlantic family. No way to deny that. But we have had serious differences before. The Suez Crisis in the 1950s, or the Iraq War in 2003 and many others. But the strength of NATO is that we have always been able to overcome these differences, be united around our core task: to protect and defend each other. One for all . . . one for all and all for one. And as long as that is credible, there’ll be no attack against any NATO Ally, because we are, by far, the strongest alliance in the world, the strongest military power in the world.
Then I would also like to say that, this perception that we are seeing a weakening of NATO is actually wrong. The United States is not leaving Europe. It is correct that after the end of the Cold War, the United States gradually reduced their military presence in Europe, for good reasons. But over the last years, the US has actually increased their military presence in Europe with more troops, more investment in infrastructure, more exercises. Just in a few months, we’ll have the biggest exercise with US troops for decades, taking place in Poland and many other European countries. 20,000 US troops being deployed from US to Europe and more US presence in general in Europe. Even in my own country, in Norway, we now have US Marines for the first time ever.
So the US is increasing their presence in Europe. And for me, that’s a sign of US commitment to NATO, not the opposite.
European Allies are also stepping up: increased readiness of our forces, battlegroups in the eastern part of the Alliance for the first time. And after years of reducing defence spending, all European Allies and Canada are now investing significantly more in defence.
So we are faced with the following paradox: it’s that while questions are asked about the strength, we are actually doing more together, North America and Europe, than we have done for many years. I would just end with the following: I have been a politician for many years and I was always . . . politicians are always criticised for, you know, being very good on rhetoric and bad on substance. The paradox in NATO is that we are not so good on rhetoric, but we are excellent on substance.
Julie Bishop: Okay, on that note, President Duda, I want to bring you to the role of NATO within the international rules-based order. Its flagship status as a multilateral organisation, as the Secretary General says, arguably . . . well, he says the most important military and political alliance. In an era of increasing unilateralism, how does NATO continue to play its critical role in partnership with organisations such as the UN and the Security Council? Can you talk a little bit about NATO in that context?
Andrzej Duda [Polish President]: Oh, the NATO. What can I say about NATO? NATO is 70 years old, yes, but we can say that NATO is adult, but it’s not old. It’s still young. And I’m very glad, because I can say that NATO is still in good shape.
This decision about joining NATO, made by Polish authorities in the 90s, and joining NATO in 1999, was one of the best decisions we made after the great changes in 1989, yes. That was a great decision because for us, NATO means peace, means security and stability and prosperity. This is the NATO. We can say that everywhere where [there] is NATO, all these elements functions. And this is crucial, and this is the most important. That’s why we can say that NATO is excellent and the best alliance in the world and the best alliance in the history of the world, yes. And this is very important now, when we talk about all these threats, all this potential crisis, which we can see, or we can expect in . . . or we can talk about with many place in the world, in the Middle East, in Europe unfortunately, also, for example, in the Ukraine. And when we talk about other potential problems, yes, this membership in NATO is crucial for Polish people. And now for example, a few days ago, yes, when we had this crisis in the Middle East, in Iraq/Iran, yes, I can . . . I could say to Polish people in TV when I was asked by journalists, ‘Take it easy, we talked with Secretary General of NATO, we talked with our Allies. We are together, NATO is ready for any response, but there will be no war and our soldiers are safe. And why? Because we have credible Allies and we are a credible Ally. And this is the most important, this is the crucial, in my opinion, element of the Alliance.
And what is our goal? Our goal is strengthen NATO as an alliance, to strengthen NATO presence in the eastern flank in Europe, because we are on the eastern flank, yes, Poland, is eastern flank of NATO, and Baltic States and our other neighbours. And this is our main interest, but we also remember about interests of our Allies, yes. So that’s why we always say this main rule of NATO, NATO 360 degree is one of the main elements of the success of the Alliance, yes. Because everyone knows in NATO that it’s safe, because he can always be sure that in any case, his Allies will come and will help him. And this is the most important. But how to compare NATO to another organisations of, for example, the UN, yes. In my opinion . . .
Julie Bishop: And particularly the Security Council.
Andrzej Duda: Especially in this military context.
Julie Bishop: Yes.
Andrzej Duda: Yes, NATO is much more efficient. This is the, I think, the most important feature of NATO. Yes, it’s . . .
Julie Bishop: And what about the . . .
Andrzej Duda: It’s much more efficient.
Julie Bishop: And the composition of the Security Council? I mean, there’s a veto there?
Andrzej Duda: Yes. Yes, I know. No, I think that the reform is very needed.
Julie Bishop: Well, maybe that’s a topic for another day. So let me nicely segue to Minister Çavuşoğlu.
Andrzej Duda: Sorry, I have no veto in the Security Council!
Julie Bishop: Mevlüt, both the Secretary General and the President have spoken in very positive terms about the value of NATO. But let’s be frank, there have been some tensions with Turkey. And I just want your perspective on how you reconcile, perhaps, an inclination to unilateralism, with your membership of NATO and your engagement with a willingness to work with the Russian military, for example. Is this consistent with the fundamental principles of NATO?
Tell the audience about the membership of NATO from Turkey’s perspective, so that we all understand.
Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu [Turkish Foreign Minister]: Thank you. First of all, I agree with Secretary General and President of Poland. And NATO is not dead. And NATO is still the strongest political military organisation.
Of course, 1980s, 1990s, 2010s and today are different than 1950s when we founded the organisation. And in the past, also, sceptics tried to make us, you know, believe that NATO is no longer valid or we don’t . . . or dead, but which was not true. And today we have to agree that it is not the end of the NATO.
There are . . . there can be some disagreements. There could be some disagreements between the member states, like us and the United States. Or Allies can be upset about something. For instance, the US is upset about the burden-sharing and they have the point. And we immediately supported the new proposal of the Secretary General for better burden-sharing, or balanced burden-sharing.
And we are also upset about something, particularly about the lack of the solidarity. Today, we are trying to adapt NATO to do new realities that NATO can face the challenges that our societies are facing. And the concerns of every single NATO member is legitimate. And our task is to meet those legitimate concerns. Legitimate concerns of the Baltic States and Poland as well.
But we have also legitimate concerns. We are fighting at the same time against many different terrorist organisations. And I haven’t, unfortunately, seen that solidarity from NATO or NATO members. A terrorist is a terrorist, an ally is an ally. This should be the understanding of principle, that we have been engaging with Russia in Syria and we have managed, until yesterday, a ceasefire in Libya together with Russia. But we don’t have any military engagement with Russia. We do trade. We do buy 50 per cent of our gas. I think Germany is buying 80 per cent of its gas from Russia, as well as many other EU member states, or NATO member states. But nobody can question our contribution to NATO. And Secretary General can agree that we are top five contributors to NATO missions and operations. And we are the top eight contributor to NATO’s global budget. And we have been hosting many NATO missions in Turkey, like host country to NATO’s Allied Land Command, in Izmir, and leadership to a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force in 2021, hopefully, and hosting the NATO’s nine High Readiness Force Commands in Istanbul and also, Forward Operating Base for NATO AWACS. And we have also radars in Turkey.
But just, you know, towards Russia, we have a dual-track approach: deterrence and dialogue. Maybe we should add engagement as well to that.
But let me give you a few examples for the contribution that Turkey is making on Black Sea. For instance, Turkey carries out maritime patrol, aircraft flights in the Black Sea in support of NATO’s assurance measures. And Turkey provides national AWACS over the Romanian airspace in context of NATO’s, again, assurance measures. And Turkey provides 63 per cent of recognised maritime … [inaudible] in the Black Sea. These are our contributions.
We are a NATO member and we have been contributing to NATO. And we have been taking the advantage of NATO. But today, what is the main challenge? The S-400 system that we had to buy from Russia. First, we have to ask ourselves:, does Turkey need this system? Yes, deliberately. Because of the threat around us. Did Turkey try to buy from its Allies, including the United States? Yes. For 10 years. Were we able to get it from them? No. Then we had to buy. And despite the fact that, particularly in last 10 years, we needed this air defence system and many Allies withdraw their batteries from along the border. And we are very grateful to Italy. They kept their SAMP/Ts until today, but they are withdrawing by the end of this year. I mean, I mean, they . . . this month probably. And we have only one Patriot battery left, the Spanish one. And this is the fact. And NATO is not able to cover my airspace fully yet. We are working on it. And what is the concern or claim? That F-45s and S-400s are not compatible. They are incompatible. This is the claim, right? And here is our proposal, let me remind, or repeat: let’s establish a working group and NATO can chair or lead this. And let them, let the experts examine this, assess this, make the assessment and they should come back to us. We believe that they are not incompatible. And we will . . . we are making sure that they will not integrate to NATO system. And those . . . this is the defence system, and it will not be, it will not pose any threat, neither to NATO systems nor to NATO Allies’.
Julie Bishop: Well, might I just ask Secretary General to comment on the proposal that Mevlüt has put forward? Will that satisfy the concerns of the NATO members about Turkey’s engagement with Russia over military equipment? And then I’ll come to you, Minister.
Jens Stoltenberg: So far, it has not been possible to reach an agreement on that. But it’s correct that this has been a proposal put forward by Turkey for some time. And of course, I have discussed this with the Foreign Minister, with Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, with President Erdoğan, but also, of course, with President Trump and the US side. And we will try to do whatever we can to try to find a way to solve this issue, because that’s one of the issues which are creating some problems inside the Alliance, there’s no way to deny that.
Let me just briefly say that Turkey is really an important Ally for many reasons. For their contributions to NATO missions and operations, but also bordering Iraq and Syria, of course, the enormous progress we have been able to make liberating all the territory that ISIS controlled until recently. That has been made possible, not least by the support of Turkey and the fact that we and the Global Coalition have used bases, infrastructure, in Turkey to be able to defeat ISIS. So we just must understand the importance of Turkey being a NATO Ally.
Julie Bishop: Now, Minister Amendola, I just want to raise with you the issue that’s been mentioned or alluded to, about the criticisms, essentially from President Trump, that member states weren’t meeting defence spending levels of at least 2 per cent of GDP. Now, of course, there’s been an increase in defence budgets. But do you think this lack of historic funding has undermined the deterrence effect? And has President Trump weakened or strengthened NATO with his public criticisms?
Vincenzo Amendola [Italian Minister of European Affairs]: Yeah, thank you very much. To be honest, it’s not the first time that an American president is figuring out this burden-sharing concern. Also, the American Congress is quite clear.
So if I look [at] the declaration signed in London in December, thanks to the Secretary General, there is a step forward. We clarify that all of us has to do more job in terms of commitment, because if you calculate just the 2 per cent, there are some countries that already reached the cap. There are some other countries that are contributing with mission. My country, I think, Secretary General, correct me, is the second in terms of participating in all the mission. So we have to work in what the declaration of this baby, that made the 70 years old in London wants to do, is adapting the structure to the changes.
If I see the success of NATO, I see two points. First is the value. I mean, in this globalised context where all the multilateral assets are fragile, the treaty has a base in the preamble, that we support liberal democracy. And when you have a clear value, you are stable on your structure.
The second point in this is also a point for the leadership: is always adapting ourselves for the change. So it means that you, of course, you need more resources, but also you have new targets, because the disruptive technology that we have in front of us are asking not just to the military assets, but also to the society to think how to reorganise, when you speak about artificial intelligence, autonomous weapons. I mean, how [to] reorganise not just your geographical flank, but also your structure.
So it is necessary, starting from London, planning the next 70 years of the Alliance, to see where we want to invest. It’s not just geopolitical, the President Duda is right. The security approach is 360 degree. Secretary General is implementing with his visit in Sicily two years ago, with the Hub in Naples, the southern flank. But Italian troops are participating also on the eastern flank, because the 360 degree approach doesn’t mean that just one of us has a concern, it’s the Alliance that has a concern. It’s not just national grabbing all the agenda.
So if I [am] to be frank, this ongoing discussion on the burden-sharing, I would like to put it in what we want to do in terms of changes. I say technology, we could speak also about climate. We could speak also how our Alliance look the new partnership. In the London Declaration, it’s expressing and underlining not just the threat of Russia, but also a discussion on China.
It’s underlined what does it mean nowadays the African threat? When I speak about African threat, I speak about terrorism in Sahel, that, of course, is a belt that is uniting the continent.
So to be positive, of course, each of us has many concerns. My country’s concern nowadays is Libya, it’s the Mediterranean southern flank. But we know that this regional Alliance has a military capability, political one, but it also has the ability to adapt itself on the changes. And I mentioned the changes in this global difficult situation.
If you allow me, I would like to conclude also on this ongoing point: sometimes when you speak about burden-sharing, because there is a debate, the European Union is developing, yes, we are developing a European Defence Fund, we are developing with PESCO some military capability in terms of industries, furniture, in terms of funding a new system. But this is a mistake to put on the same level. European Union has the ability to be a multidimensional organisation. But our military alliance is NATO. So let’s never put in contradiction. It’s what we have to create, of course, is multi-dimensional agreement like Stoltenberg did with the partnership . . . Joint Declaration partnership on eight points with the European Union.
So if we want to rebuild up a multilateral, not just alliance, because the Alliance is based on value, but also a multilateral framework of action in terms of security, preventing threats. We have to work, of course, each of us from different level on different concern. But if I be honest with you, when the Secretary General travelled to Sigonella two days ago, in our base in Sicily, it was not just that we follow, let’s say, a national concern, because I think it’s an Alliance concern. When we see the southern flank, we see a sea – Mediterranean Sea – where the three big . . . or four big players are present there, where the connection between the continent is becoming in terms of energy, migrants, in terms of conflict resolution, a global agenda. So when we see the Mediterranean, nowadays, we see Russia, China, with the trade with the European Union, of course, we see the American satellite that are present, so in this small sea that is just 1 per cent of the worldwide map, we have all the agenda of the world nowadays, that we have to work together in 36 degree, but with the security approach that has to adapt to the change of our Alliance.
Julie Bishop: Now, that raises the question of the definition of an attack that warrants a collective response. So let’s turn to a cyber-attack, for example. Does it cross that NATO threshold? What are the red lines for cyber-attacks on NATO members, for example? President Duda, your thoughts?
Andrzej Duda: Thank you, Mr Minister, for this few words about this NATO 360 degrees, because this is very, very good example of NATO. 360 degrees that Italian soldiers, they are in Latvia.
Andrzej Duda: Yes, as members of the Enhanced Forward Presence. And Polish soldiers, Polish pilots are in Sicily, and they help Italian soldiers protect Italian borders on the sea. And this is the . . . I can say this is the model of this cooperation, fulfilling this very important . . . or the most important principle as is this NATO’s 360 degree. But you asked me about . . .
Julie Bishop: Cyber. I mean, from a treaty that was signed in 1949, in the aftermath of the Second World War, which was very much about sovereign states. Now, 70 years later, the definition of an attack?
Andrzej Duda: The definition of an attack. Yes, and this is . . . oh, you touched a very, very, very important problem: what means war today, yes. And how to define it. When we can say that this is a war, when can say that this is real attack, yes. Hybrid war . . .
Julie Bishop: When is the NATO response triggered then?
Andrzej Duda: Yes. And this is one of the problems, we have to discuss during our meetings, because this is really the problem of current days, and also, especially, the problem of the future, yes. But . . . because we have to be prepared for cyber-attacks. And we are preparing our security systems for that threat. But I think this is the main question of future, yes, because we talked about Industrial Revolution and we talked about the economy, fourth generation. Yes. We are talking about 5G and other expected changes in our technologies and in our environment. And this is a crucial element because maybe it’s … What is the most difficult element? The most difficult element in general in the matter of cyber-threat is that one small unit can attack. You don’t need [an] army. You . . . it’s enough to have one experienced and very clever man with a very modern and efficient infrastructure, yes, computer and other systems. And this person could be dangerous for institution, for country, or for even whole Alliance, yes. And this is one of the main problems. And this is one of the main difficulties, because how to find this person and, of course, how to protect us because we know what to do when we have physical attack. Yes. When we have physical attack, we know we have to stand, we have to send our military troops, yes, we have to help, we will send our tanks or our planes, and we have, for example, common security missions on the Baltic Sea, yes. And . . . we do that and this is our pragmatic approach. But the question is: what to do against massive cyber-attacks?
Julie Bishop: Well, on that point, if I might, Mr President, turn to the Secretary General. The President’s spoken about the difficulties of determining a cyber-attack. Is NATO fit for purpose in the era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution in terms of cyber warfare? What are the red lines for NATO?
Jens Stoltenberg: So, first of all, I think NATO has realised that the nature of warfare is fundamentally changing, not only because of cyber, but because of artificial intelligence, autonomous weapon systems, facial recognition. And if you combine all of this, of course, we can imagine weapons systems, which are really, really terrible and devastating impact if they are used. And it’s also much harder to, for instance, have arms control when you don’t count warheads. But we’re trying to, in a way, measure algorithms and technologies, which the world has never really seen being used in a military domain.
And I think it’s hard for us to really grasp the consequences of what we’re seeing. When you read books about the First World War, one of the shocking things is that they didn’t realise the consequences of the Industrial Revolution for war fighting. And I’m afraid something of the same is happening now, that we don’t really understand how much technology is changing also the nature of warfare.
We are investing a lot in keeping the technological edge within all these technologies. On cyber, in particular, we have decided that a cyber-attack can trigger Article 5. And that was actually an important decision. So if there is a cyber-attack on an Ally, we can trigger the whole Alliance. The whole response from the whole Alliance. And then we keep, what should I say, the right to decide how we respond. We have offensive cyber. NATO Allies have, and we can facilitate that into a NATO framework. We have used that against, for instance, Daesh. I think sometimes people don’t realise how much the Fight against Daesh was a cyber campaign, taking out their cyber capabilities, shutting down their home pages. Everything they did on cyber – recruiting, financing, propaganda – NATO Allies, using cyber, were able to take that down.
So we can trigger Article 5, but we can respond in cyber, but we can also respond in all other domains. That’s for us to decide. We will never give the advantage to a potential adversary that we will tell them exactly where the red line is and how we will respond. We will take the necessary measures to respond to any attack from 360 degrees, but including cyber. So yeah, we are ready. But to be ready today doesn’t mean that you’re ready tomorrow. So we need to continue to adapt and that’s hard work.
Julie Bishop: Thank you for that answer. Perhaps a change of pace. And if I could get you all to respond to this, and I’ll start with you, Mevlüt. There’s been considerable debate about the benefits and costs of NATO enlargement in the past. And . . . what’s your view on a further enlargement of the NATO membership? Is it going to strengthen or weaken the Alliance? What’s the optimal size for NATO?
Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu: Well, first of all, let me also reiterate our commitment to 360 degree protection and for . . . because of this understanding, we are going to, in May, increase our contribution to NATO missions in Baltic States, including the missions about cyber-attack.
And as Turkey, we are for enlargement. And it’s good that North Macedonia is becoming a full member soon. And, I hope EU follow this good example, that they can give a date for North Macedonia and Albania.
It is not that easy for Bosnia and Herzegovina right now. But we can be more flexible. That’s why we have amended the Tallinn Criteria, for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and because of the differences in the country. You can imagine why.
And I don’t understand why we have not invited Georgia, or we haven’t activated the, actually, Action Plan for Georgia. Now, we are criticised for having relatively better relations with Russia as neighbour. But our Western friends are not inviting, or not agreeing to invite Georgia for the . . . with the pretext that we have . . . we shouldn’t provoke Russia. But Georgia needs us, and we need an ally like Georgia. So this is what Turkey believes, that we believe in enlargement. And Georgia should be also . . . should also become a NATO member.
Julie Bishop: Mr Amendola, if we could be short, because I think we’re going to get the wind up in a few minutes, I’m afraid.
Vincenzo Amendola: One minute I give. I do. I answer in one minute.
Vincenzo Amendola: The Turkish Minister, you are right. At one point in our agenda, let’s be clear, I’m not so diplomatic. Of course, it’s the confrontation with Russia. And that’s the point of Georgia. The point of Ukraine. But if I go back to the reason why we already did 70 years old, is that in the preamble, it is clear that we support liberal democracy. Honestly, I engage with everybody. Secretary General opened the issue of relation and global partnership with China and so on. But we are clear on the preamble. So you can discuss and, of course, trade agreement with everybody, but Russia, I’m sorry, this supporting of an illiberal democracy as the future of the . . . let’s say, the assets of institution is a part that make us in a problem. And to strengthen NATO, you have to strengthen . . . be based on your value. If you want to confront with everybody, I mean, we have to . . . we are a regional military Alliance, confronting all over the world, but based on your value. And based on your value you can even plan your next 70 years of life.
Julie Bishop: Thank you. President Duda?
Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu: But Georgia has a liberal democracy right now.
Vincenzo Amendola: Yeah, but the discussion, sure, is more complex.
Julie Bishop: You’ve made the point. President Duda, just your thoughts on optimal size. And you two behave yourselves up there!
Andrzej Duda: You know, we are relatively new Ally, yes. Because we joined NATO in 1999. That was, as I said, one of the most important decisions in our history, after the Second World War. And now we are sure, not only that we are safe, but especially that we are part of the free, democratic world, and that NATO guarantee not only peace and security, but also, as I said, prosperity and peaceful life. And that’s why I think we have to leave the doors to NATO open for new members for all potential candidates. Yes. To have this possibility, to tell them, ‘Look, if you fulfil all conditions, needed as a NATO member, you could join NATO in future, and we observe you and you have a chance to be part of this, the best alliance in the world.’
Yes. I can tell you this is, you know, this is my own experience. So I remember these days when we were behind the Iron Curtain, yes. And NATO was our dream. Yes. NATO won this Cold War. Of course, I prefer to say that Polish people, Solidarity, won Cold War, yes. But the truth is that NATO have this very, very tough posture and very tough behaviour, yes. And that’s why the Soviet Russia collapsed, yes. Because NATO was stronger and had better politics and, of course, had also better economic situation, yes. But this is, in my opinion, NATO is a crucial element of the free world, now, so we have to leave these doors open for new countries, for all these potential members who want to be with us, who want to create a protected free world with us.
Julie Bishop: Thank you, Mr President. I’m going to give the last sentence to the Secretary General, to remind us all why an institution like NATO must continue to prosper and thrive into the future. And then we’re wrapping it up.
Jens Stoltenberg: Because in uncertain times, in unpredictable times, in unpredictable times, we strong international institutions and NATO is a strong multinational institution which has preserved peace for more than 70 years. And peace is also important as we look ahead, and therefore we need NATO also in the future.
Julie Bishop: Indeed. And at the time when the international rules-based order is under pressure, under threat, is being ignored by some; elements of it being cherry-picked by others, an institution such as NATO deserves our support. So, would you please thank the panel for a stimulating discussion on the future of NATO. Thank you very much, thank you.