Beyond the Ukraine War, NATO and Europe Are Still Dependent on the US * The Gateway Pundit * by Antonio Graceffo

The Ukraine war has underscored NATO and Europe’s continued reliance on the United States for defense. Ukraine’s air defense is running short of Patriot interceptors, and Europe has not been able to close the gap on its own. President Volodymyr Zelensky told reporters that Ukraine has only about a tenth of the interceptors it needs from the United States.

The Chatham House reports that the Ukraine Contact Group of European states pledged $4 billion for Ukrainian air defense in June 2026, including more than $1 billion earmarked for Patriots, but notes that it remains doubtful the United States will supply the missiles. Europe does not build the Patriot system itself, and Ukrainian-made Patriots are not a near-term solution. Analysts cited by Chatham House estimate it would take 18 to 24 months just to establish a pilot production line domestically.

European governments have responded by purchasing American-made systems for Ukraine rather than replacing them with European production. Germany pledged more than $2 billion in military aid, including Patriot interceptors, while Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, and Sweden joined the fast-track purchasing program. However, the arrangement still relies on American manufacturing capacity rather than an independent European supply.

Four years into the war, Europe has not built the domestic capacity to cover its own air defense needs, let alone Ukraine’s, leaving Kyiv’s interceptor stocks dependent on U.S.-made weapons.

Beneath the missile shortfall sits a deeper dependency: NATO lacks sufficient independent capacity in satellite intelligence and reconnaissance, strategic airlift, air-to-air refueling, command-and-control infrastructure, and nuclear deterrence, relying heavily on the United States for all five. The NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre, based at RAF Molesworth in the UK, brings together NATO and partner-nation analysts to produce shared intelligence assessments on military threats and terrorism for the alliance as a whole.

Though housed in Britain, the Fusion Centre was established with the United States as the “framework nation,” meaning American intelligence architecture and staffing underpin an institution that operates as a multinational NATO body. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe, who oversees NATO’s intelligence and surveillance forces, has by convention always been an American general.

A Kiel Institute report, produced with Bruegel, states that Europe depends heavily on the US not only for deployable troops but also for ‘strategic enablers,’ pointing to continued reliance on American systems for critical modern military capabilities even as European defense budgets have surged. Sven Biscop of the Egmont Royal Institute told Defense News that Europe is “almost completely dependent” on U.S. intelligence for satellite capability and everything that goes with it, adding that closing the gap will take time. The United States operated 246 military satellites as of 2023, compared with 49 for all of European NATO combined, led by France with 15, according to the same reporting.

A CSIS assessment of Europe’s options without the United States found the same imbalance in airlift, air refueling, and command and control, concluding that the loss of U.S. strategic airlift capacity “would severely hamper Europe’s ability to respond rapidly to crises,” because European nations never developed equivalent capabilities of their own.

Beyond satellites and airlift, most European NATO members have no independent nuclear deterrent and rely on the American nuclear umbrella, including U.S. nuclear weapons stationed in several member states under NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangement. European defense also depends on the broader American security architecture of U.S. troops and bases stationed across the continent.

That same dependence runs through Europe’s broader security posture as the United States moves to scale back its troop presence on the continent. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has repeatedly played down the withdrawal, telling reporters in Vilnius that he was convinced there would remain “a very strong conventional” U.S. presence in Europe alongside the nuclear one. Later, during a visit to Romania, he said observers were “making a little bit too much” of the drawdown because troop levels remain higher than before 2022.

Germany’s defense minister, Boris Pistorius, called a 5,000-troop reduction anticipated rather than welcome, saying the American presence serves the interests of both countries while adding that Europeans “must assume more responsibility” for their own security.

GLOBSEC, the Bratislava-based think tank, reports that Washington has briefed NATO officials on plans to reduce military assets available to the alliance in a crisis, including fighter jets, strategic bombers, destroyers, submarines, and tanker aircraft. GLOBSEC described the reductions as the most substantial revision of American force posture in Europe since the end of the Cold War. It identified air-to-air refueling as a critical dependency, noting that NATO’s dual-capable aircraft assigned to deliver U.S. nuclear weapons rely on tanker support for the nuclear mission.

The EU’s Institute for Security Studies rated new Russian military action against non-NATO neighboring states as a high risk for 2026, concluding that the EU remains “nowhere near able to replace US guarantees” in the short term. Rutte, addressing a Munich Security Conference event in Berlin, told allies to “be crystal clear about the threat,” warning that Russia’s war-footing economy could leave it capable of using force against NATO within five years. He cited Russian production of roughly 2,000 cruise and ballistic missiles and 2,900 attack drones per month.

At the Berlin summit of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and the UK, leaders affirmed their unwavering commitment to the transatlantic bond and “the vital role the US continues to play in the Alliance,” while agreeing to deter what they called “the most significant and direct threat from Russia.” At the Ankara summit that followed, all 32 NATO members formally reaffirmed their ironclad commitment to collective defense under Article 5, declaring that Russia poses “the long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security and stability.”

That dependency has not stopped European officials from directing public blame at Washington when U.S. support wavered. French Prime Minister François Bayrou said in March 2025 that the suspension of American weapons deliveries meant the United States was “abandoning Kyiv and letting Russia win,” and called on Europe to replace U.S. deliveries quickly. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas responded to the February 2025 Trump-Zelensky clash by declaring that “the free world needs a new leader.”

Europe’s call for a new leader, however, comes as the continent remains unable to defend itself independently or scale up production sufficiently to defend Ukraine without American support. And what country does Europe believe could do better than the United States?

Germany has the largest industrial base in Europe. Yet four years of Zeitenwende rhetoric and an overwhelmingly national procurement pattern rather than a pooled European one have failed to produce strategic independence. Germany’s defense spending still stands at roughly one-eighth of U.S. and three-fifths of Russian spending.

The binding constraint has not been what Europe is capable of building. It has been what Europe has chosen, gradually and often reluctantly, to build while relying on the United States to fill the gaps.